1 QOP combined services for children in AFDC families with modest financial incentives for enrollment in a small randomized pilot. LEAP used financial incentives along with case management and support services to increase the school enrollment of welfare mothers in a randomized demonstration. EMA pays children or mothers of children in low-income families based on enrollment and achievement, and is currently being evaluated in a nonrandomized study. Progresa offered payments based on the enrollment status of primary and secondary school children in randomly selected towns in Mexico. The PACES program awarded vouchers for private school in a lottery for 6 th graders in Colombia. This had an achievement component because vouchers were lost if students failed to keep up with schoolwork. As far as we know, however, ours are the first demonstrations to combine substantial achievement-based payments to students with a randomized experimental design. 3 achievement awards program in detail. This section also outlines the theoretical context for programs of this type. Other interventions in this spirit include the Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP; Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron, 1994) ; the Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) demonstration project in Ohio (Long, Gueron, Wood, Fisher, and Fellerath, 1996) ; the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in Britain (Deardon, et al, 2001) ; Progresa in Mexico (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2000; Schultz, 2001) ; and the Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES), which provided private school vouchers in Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer, 2002) . 1 The Achievement Awards experiment also has elements in common with the college tuition subsidy programs run by the I Have a
Dream Foundation, and Robert Reich's (1998) proposal to pay targeted bonuses of $25,000 to high school graduates from low-income families.
Section II discusses the pilot experiment and Section III presents background for the school-based demonstration. Section IV discusses results from the schools demonstration, which, while not entirely clearcut, suggest the probability of Bagrut certification increased by 6-8 percentage points in Award schools.
Consistent with a causal interpretation of these results, analyses conditional on previous test results show treatment effects only for students with achievement levels that put them in a position to benefit from additional effort. In contrast, randomization within schools clearly failed to generate a change in achievement. Together these results support the hypothesis that the participation of school administrators and teachers is important for the success of individual incentive programs like those tested here. Section V concludes and outlines directions for further work.
I. Background

A. Theoretical Context
Why do young men and women fail to complete high school? Why don't more people go to college?
These questions present something of a puzzle since the economic returns to schooling appear to be very large, and almost certainly exceed the costs of additional schooling for most non-college graduates. Research on education choices suggests possible explanations for low schooling levels, mostly related to heterogeneity in costs (or perceived costs) and heterogeneity in returns (or expected returns). Using data from the NLSY, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) link the drop-out decision to lack of ability and motivation, low expectations about the rewards from graduation, disutility from schooling, and a comparative advantage in the jobs available to non-graduates. Another consideration raised in the literature on college attendance is liquidity constraints and the role of financial aid (see, e.g., Fuller, Manski, and Wise, 1982; Card and Lemieux, 2000) . Since capital markets are imperfect and human capital is hard to collateralize, some poor students may chose not to go school in the absence of subsidies.
A number of features of the Israeli economic environment dovetail with the issues raised in previous research on low educational attainment. First, while high school is free, there is an opportunity cost to schooling since students can work, perhaps at the expense of remedial programs that might make Bagrut success more likely. A related concern is that some teenagers act as if they have very high discount rates (see, e.g., Gruber, 2000) . Israeli requirements for compulsory military service (at least 3 years for boys and 2 years for girls) probably exacerbate the impact of discounting since working life for a male college graduate does not begin until 6-7 years after high school. Uncertainty about returns may also be greater for poor Israelis, who are disproportionately likely to live in small towns with few educated adult role models.
Finally, peer effects may be a negative influence in some of the relatively isolated communities where education is lowest.
Bagrut status in Israel is not directly comparable to an American student's drop-out status since most 2 Bagrut statistics for the 2000 school year are available at http//www.netvision.net.il/bagrut/ netunim2000.htm#1.4. 5 of the students who fail to complete a Bagrut still finish their secondary schooling. Nevertheless, as for American high school dropouts, post-secondary schooling options for Israeli graduates without a Bagrut are limited; very few non-Bagrut holders will obtain further schooling. Of course, many students may not be able to complete a Bagrut no matter how hard they try. But the substantial cross-sectional and time series variation in Bagrut rates suggests that some students attending schools with low completion rates could, under some circumstances, do better. This possibility is highlighted by the Ministry of Education's practice of reporting the proportion of high school seniors who are "close" but fail to obtain a Bagrut, on the order of 22 percent.
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The Achievement Awards demonstrations were motivated by a desire to tip the scales towards current investment in schooling and away from market work or leisure, especially for students close to the margin for Bagrut success. The concrete and relatively immediate awards offered by the programs should have increased the present value of studying for exams and reduced uncertainty about returns. The programs may also have provided a cover story that students could use to justify schoolwork in the face of ridicule by non-studying peers. Our intervention is in the spirit of Reich's (1998) proposal to offer students from lowincome families in the US a $25,000 cash bonus for graduating high school. Keane and Wolpin (2000) simulated the impact of this policy in the context of a structural model of education choice. They estimated that the Reich program would have a large impact on high school graduation rates and college attendance, especially for Blacks.
B. The Israeli School System
Israeli education consists of elementary school (grades 1-6), middle school (grades 7-9) and high school (grades 10-12). High school students are enrolled in an academic track leading to a Bagrut, or in a 6 vocational track leading to a diploma. The Bagrut is completed by passing a series of national exams in core and elective subjects beginning in 10 th grade, with more tests taken in 11 th grade and most taken in 12 th grade.
Students choose to be tested at various proficiency levels, with each test awarding 1 to 5 credit units per subject, depending on difficulty. Some subjects are mandatory and many must be taken for at least 3 units. 
II. The Pilot Experiment
Our investigation of financial incentives for students began with a pilot evaluation in the 1999-2000 school year involving approximately 500 students in low-achieving schools in Southern Israel. We hoped to increase the number of students taking the various Bagrut subject tests, to encourage students in trouble to take advantage of remedial services, and to increase study effort at school and at home. Students in the treatment group were told that Bagrut achievers would have their choice of $800 in cash, a $1,000 voucher to be used towards a trip of educational value, or a $1,200 voucher to be used towards the cost of higher education. Students who were offered the opportunity to earn an award were notified in writing in March 2000. The time lines for both the pilot and follow-up programs appear in the Appendix.
Treated students in the pilot were notified of the intervention later than originally planned, a fact that reduced the scope for changes in behavior that could have increased the likelihood of obtaining a Bagrut in June. On the other hand, students have the opportunity to boost their efforts towards the Bagrut at any time,
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and have access to remedial instruction through schools and outside of school. Moreover, Israeli seniors have the opportunity to try some Bagrut subject tests again the following winter, provided they have not already been drafted. The pilot data analyzed here include the winter retests.
The pilot experiment differed from the larger school-based experiment which followed in that we used a design that randomized students within schools. Randomization within schools should have provided a more powerful design with less data. In practice, however, simple randomization was seen by school administrators as hard to justify to participants and outside observers. We therefore used a hybrid instrumental variables design that selected students for treatment on the basis of their socioeconomic characteristics and a partially randomized threshold, described in more detail below. year into three groups on the basis of the number of Bagrut subject tests they had taken previously and their maximum score on these tests (recall that the Bagrut is determined by a series of tests, some of which are usually taken in 10 th and 11 th grade). We estimated Logit regressions with information from the previous cohort of students to predict the probability of Bagrut certification as a function of these two variables, denoted here by p 1i for student i. All students with a very low probability of Bagrut attainment (p 1i <.053)
were offered the opportunity to earn a bonus. It was inexpensive and politically expedient to offer bonuses to this group, about 15 percent of enrolled seniors in the Southern cohort.
At the other end, students with a very high probability of success were excluded, in particular, we did not offer bonuses to 612 students with p 1i >.66, about half of seniors. The remaining 491 students were 5 The analysis sample includes 489 eligible students because of missing demographic data not used for treatment assignment but used in the analysis. 8 potentially eligible for an award.
5 Treatment was assigned to these students as a function of family size and father's education, with students of lower socioeconomic status more likely to be in the treatment group. We chose this mechanism because the Israeli Ministry of Education commonly allocates education resources in this way (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 1999) . Again, we used the previous cohort of seniors to estimate the probability a student would obtain a Bagrut certificate as a function of family size and father's schooling, denoted p 2i . To introduce an element of random assignment, we used a threshold that varied by student and school, so that roughly half of the eligible students from each school were offered treatment. The rule for treatment assignment for student i in school j was
where q .22 (j) and q .7 (j) are the .22 and .7 quantiles of the p 2i distribution in school j.
The hybrid experimental designed is sketched in Table 1 , which reports the number of students in the all-treated, no-treated, and eligible samples. For the eligible sample, the table shows the number of students exposed to a high (Z i =1) and low (Z i =0) threshold and the number offered the opportunity to earn an award. The design is such that about half of eligible students were exposed to a high threshold and about half of eligibles had the opportunity to earn an award. Exposure to the high threshold instead of the low increased the probability of treatment by about 50 percentage points since the probability of treatment increased from about one-quarter to about three-quarters.
Descriptive statistics for the eligible, all-treated, and non-treated samples are presented in Table 2 .
About one-third of eligible students received a Bagrut. By construction, the probability of receiving a Bagrut is very low (%2.7 ) in the all-treated sample, and relatively high (%77.3) in the no-treated samples.
Other covariates in the table are the test-history variables used to construct the index determining eligibility status (i.e., the regressors used to construct p 1i ) and the socioeconomic regressors used to construct p 2i . The 9 bottom panel provides information on some additional characteristics that can be used to assess the success of the random assignment of the threshold shifter, Z i . There is no significant association between Z i and any covariate. There is also no significant association between Z i and Bagrut status, although those exposed to a high threshold were much more likely to have been given the opportunity to earn an award.
The experimental design detailed in Tables 1 and 2 amounts to simple random assignment for those with p 2i in the interval [q .22 (j), q .7 (j)]. Alternately, we can think of this as random assignment conditional on the covariates p 2i and school effects. Finally, the design can be seen as generating an instrument, Z i , for the endogenous regressor, T ij (endogenous in this case means correlated with family background). We focus on the instrumental variables interpretation, reporting reduced form estimates of the effects of exposure to the high threshold on the likelihood of obtaining a Bagrut certificate. Table 3 reports the reduced form estimates for models including a range of covariates. Data are from the eligible sample of 489 and a subsample of 439 that excludes students attending the single Bedouin school in the sample. Some of the models include school fixed effects. Although exposure to a high threshold is associated with a precisely estimated 50-53 percentage point first stage, there is no association between Z i and Bagrut attainment. Note that because the first-stage effect was .5, standard errors for the effect of treatment are approximately double those for the reduced form effects shown in the table. 7 We interviewed principals at each treatment school to verify this. Unlike in the pilot, treated students in this case were notified early enough to request a deferment for military service if they wanted to retake Bagrut tests. In practice, this option seems unlikely to have been a major contributor towards program effects. 10 particular analysis by subgroup, one of many possible analyses of this type, uncovered this pattern by chance.
B. Results
As a specification check, we therefore repeated the analysis by sex in two further subgroups. The first is the "random assignment sample", i.e., those students with p 2i in the interval [q .22 (j), q .7 (j)]. For this group T ij =Z i , and the effect of Z i should be strongest. In contrast, for those with p 2i outside this interval, the "nofirst-stage sample", treatment status is orthogonal to Z i and determined solely by whether p 2i is below q .22 (j) or above q .7 (j).
The results of this specification check, reported in Table 4 , suggest the negative effect for boys and positive effect for girls is just a chance occurrence. Estimates using the no-first-stage sample show no relationship between Z i and treatment status for either sex, yet the association between Z i and Bagrut rates is even larger than in the random assignment sample where Z i =T ij . We therefore conclude that the pilot experiment had no effect on achievement, though a null hypothesis of modest effects cannot be rejected either. This built-in specification check is a useful feature of the hybrid design. Another useful finding is that of the 80 awards given out in the pilot, only 2 were to students from the low-scoring all-treated sample.
No award recipients chose the travel option, and only 5 chose the $1,200 tuition voucher. We therefore switched to an all-cash scheme in the larger school-based experiment.
III. Background for the Schools Experiment
To kick off the school-based demonstration, we conducted an orientation with principals and administrators from treatment schools in January 2001. Some principals chose not to participate, though most were enthusiastic, and informed their students shortly thereafter, usually in a school assembly or a classroom announcement. Many schools also distributed written materials describing the program to students and/or their parents. 7 The award schedule is detailed in the appendix. The program was meant to last 3 9 In June of 2001, around the time of the Bagrut tests, an Israeli television station ran a special program that included interviews with pilot participants, as well as with one of us (Lavy) and program critics. The participants' comments suggested the program was of considerable interest to students.
10 Israel runs semi-autonomous school systems for Secular Jews, Religious Jews, and Arabs. Rules for Bagrut are similar in all three systems. 11 We used 1999 Bagrut rates to select and match schools because the 2000 data were incomplete when treatment was assigned.
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found that students in treated schools reported studying 2.7 hours per week between January and June, 11 percent more than the 2.4 average hours of study in control schools. This is consistent with the program having caused 25% of students to study an extra 2 hours per week for 3 months. The academic value of this extra effort is a separate question, however, and the subject of our impact evaluation.
A. Experimental Design and Descriptive Statistics
In December 2000, we selected 40 high schools with low 1999 Bagrut rates, but above a minimum threshold rate of 3 percent. Some schools with low completion rates were ineligible to participate in the experiment for technical or administrative reasons. The list of participating schools included 10 Arab and 10 Jewish religious schools.
10 Treatment was randomly assigned to 20 of the 40 participating schools. The total number of treated schools was determined by the program budget constraint, which allowed about 750,000 dollars for award payments.
Random assignment of entire schools does not balance treatment and control characteristics as effectively as random assignment of students within schools. Nevertheless, while not large enough to ensure treatment-control balance, the number of clusters used here is typical (see, e.g., Feng, et al, 2001 ). To improve treatment-control balance we used a matching strategy that paired treatment and control schools based on lagged values of the primary outcome of interest, the average 1999 Bagrut rate. 11 Treatment was assigned randomly within pairs, as is common in GRTs (see, e.g., Gail, et al, 1996) . Such pre-treatment matching is typically worthwhile provided that (a) matching effectively balances pre-treatment outcomes;
and (b) lagged outcomes are a reasonably good predictor of future outcomes. Although the variability documented in Table 1 is clearly undesirable, it bears emphasizing that substantial variability in year-to-year performance measures for individual schools is not unique to our sample. Using data on North Carolina schools, for example, Kane and Staiger (2001) similarly found that much of the year-to-year variation in performance is due to school-level random shocks that come from sources other than sampling variance and permanent differences in school characteristics. Table 5 also reports the probability of being on the Bagrut track for seniors at each school. Most of the students in the sample were registered as being on the Bagrut track in spite of the low probability of ultimately receiving a Bagrut. In the analysis that follows, we focus on samples that include all students since reported track-status may be endogenous. This endogeneity is a consequence of the fact that track status is reported with error, and errors are more likely to be corrected for those students who ultimately received a Bagrut.
B. Econometric Framework
Because treatment was randomly assigned in the schools experiment, unbiased estimates of treatment effects can be obtained from simple treatment-control comparisons. In practice, however, a number of complications are worth special attention. First, as noted above, randomization by cluster is less likely than individual-level randomization to balance confounding factors, even after matching. This is especially relevant in view of the unstable Bagrut rates in Table 5 . We attempted to improve treatment-control balance by discarding 4 pairs with the largest (as measured by t-statistics) differences in 2000 Bagrut rates. Other econometric issues are discussed below.
Adjusting for Non-Compliance
Schools' compliance status may be endogenous in the sense that it was partly determined by anticipated Bagrut rates. If so, estimates in a sample limited to schools that complied will be biased. A simple approach to the compliance problem is to estimate "intention-to-treat effects", i.e., the reduced-form impact of the randomized offer of program participation in the full sample. Such estimates are reported below. Intention-to-treat effects provide a lower bound on the effect of actual program participation and can 12 A recent experiment in financial education illustrates this point (Duflo and Saez, 2002) .
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be re-scaled into effects on students in treated schools by using the randomized opportunity to participate in the program as an instrumental variable for actual participation. Because no control schools received treatment, this approach estimates the effect of treatment on the treated (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) .
A second adjustment for compliance is suggested by eliminates 3 out of 5 non-compliant schools and 2/3 of non-compliant students. We therefore report results for a "low-rate sample" of schools with 1999 Bagrut rates less than .25, as well as for the full sample and the balanced sample noted above. As it turns out, treatment and control schools are also more comparable (as measured by 2000 Bagrut rates) in the low-rate sample.
Inference in Group Randomized Trials
Randomized trials that assign treatment status to entire schools may be more attractive than withinschool randomization for both programmatic and logistical reasons. First, school randomization reduces the perception of unfairness associated with randomization. Second, students not offered treatment may nevertheless be affected by treatments received by others in the same school, diluting within-school treatment effects. Finally, education interventions may be more effective when introduced at the school level.
Incentive programs for students depend partly on the cooperation of teachers and school administrators, and may get additional leverage from peer effects when those nearby participate.
12
13 GEE standard errors are produced by the Stata "Cluster" option and SAS GENMOD procedure. 14 See, e.g., Thornquist and Anderson (1992) .
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The most important statistical issue in school-level GRTs is whether to treat groups (schools) or students as the unit of observation, and, if the latter, how best to adjust inferential procedures for clustering at the group level. As Cornfeld (1978) notes, analyses of GRTs that ignore clustering are "an exercise in self-deception." The traditional cluster adjustment relies on a linear model with random effects, an approach known to economists primarily through the work of Moulton (1986) . When the clusters are all of size n, this amounts to multiplying standard errors by a "design effect," [1+(n!1)D] 1/2 , where D measures the intra-cluster residual correlation. A problem with random effects models in this context is that the equi-correlated error structure they impose is implausible for binary outcomes like Bagrut status. Another problem is that estimates of D tend to be too low.
A modern variation on random effects models is the Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) framework developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) . GEE allows for an unrestricted correlation structure and can be used for binary outcomes and nonlinear models such as Logit and Poisson regression. An advantage of GEE is that it is very flexible and increasingly available in proprietary software.
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The primary disadvantage is that the validity of GEE inference turns on an asymptotic argument based on the number of clusters (as do parametric random effects models). GRTs often have too few clusters for asymptotic formulas to provide an acceptably accurate approximation to the finite-sample sampling distribution.
14 A simple alternative to micro-level analyses is to work with grouped data, in this case, school means.
Average Bagrut rates are approximately Normally distributed so t-tests may be valid even with a moderate number of groups. On the other hand, grouped analyses are conservative in the sense that they treat additional observations within schools as if they were uninformative beyond their impact on the dispersion of the averages. Statistical tests based on grouped data may therefore be less powerful than those based on micro data.
We present regression estimates of treatment effects using both micro and grouped data. The model used to construct estimates using student data can be written:
where i indexes students; j=1, . . ., 20 indexes pairs; t=0,1 indexes treatment status within pairs, and Z jt is assigned treatment status. Grouped covariates includes pair effects, " j , and two school-level covariates denoted x jt , which consist of dummies for Arab and religious schools. The student-level covariates are three dummies (d qi ; q=2, 3, 4) indicating the quartile of a student's average test score on Bagrut and diploma tests taken as of January 2001, when the program was implemented. It turns out that this lagged score variable, described in more detail below, is the single best predictor we have of students' Bagrut status.
Grouped estimates were constructed similarly. The typical grouped equation can be written:
where y G jt is the school average Bagrut rate and 0 G jt is a grouped error term. Some of these estimates are weighted by the school size, n jt . As suggested by classical results on regression efficiency, it seems natural to weight, and weighted estimation using groups produces the same estimates as micro data when there are no covariates. On the other hand, in models with group random effects (implicit in this case since we worry about clustering), weighted estimation need not be more efficient. Moreover, when treatment effects are heterogeneous, weighted and unweighted procedures estimate different average effects.
We also experimented with a two-step procedure discussed by Baker and Fortin (2001) and Donald and Lang (2001) . In our case, this amounts to adjusting school means for micro covariates by estimating school fixed effects in an equation like (1), and then regressing the estimated fixed effects on treatment status and other school-level covariates in an equation like (2). In particular, we first estimate
and then regress : jt , the estimated : jt , on the same covariates as in equation (2). This procedure uses the micro-data to reduce the dispersion in means, while inference is conservative in the sense that no credit is taken for within-cluster variability in the second step. Donald and Lang (2001) A final statistical issue worth noting is that some of the regression estimates are from models that omit pair effects. In principle, pair effects can be dropped without biasing the estimates of treatment effects since intention to treat is assigned with equal probability across pairs. Ignoring stratification variables may also lead to more precise estimates in paired experiments since the inclusion of pair effects uses up degrees of freedom (Diehr, et al, 1995; Angrist and Hahn, 1999) . On the other hand, with few pairs, a chance association between pair characteristics and treatment status is possible.
IV. Results from the Schools Experiment
Post-treatment Bagrut rates in treated schools are higher on average than those in control schools, conditional on baseline (2000) Bagrut rates. This can be seen in Figure 1 Table 6 , which report estimates of equation (2) The standard errors quoted above (and reported in Table 6 Note that the generally larger estimated effects (weighted or unweighted) in the balanced and lowrate samples are consistent with the fact that the compliance rate is 75 percent in the full sample, but 86-87 percent in the balanced and low-rate samples. Thus, we would expect intention-to-treat effects to be about 15 percent larger in the latter two samples, a factor that does not seem too far off the mark. Finally, note that while the estimates for 2001 increase as we move to the balanced and low-rate samples, this is not typically the case using 2000 data, providing an encouraging specification check.
B. Estimates Using Student Data
In an attempt to check robustness and increase the precision of the estimated treatment effects, we used micro data to control for students' performance on tests taken as of the baseline date, January 2001.
In particular, we divided the credit-unit-weighted average score on all Bagrut and Diploma tests (coding zeros for those with no tests), and then coded dummies for each quartile of the score distribution. We used quartile dummies instead of, say, linear control for lagged scores, to facilitate the analysis conditional on lagged scores discussed below. The quartile dummies are a powerful predictor of students' ultimate Bagrut status. For example, the probability of being awarded a Bagrut 2001 was about 1% in the lowest quartile, 16 The decline in standard errors when going from grouped to two-step estimates is consistent with fact that the standard deviation of the estimated : jt is about 82 percent of the standard deviation of y G jt . Note that the ratio of two-step to grouped standard errors for the weighted full sample is .041/.05 =.82 for the model in column 6. When constructing standard errors for the two-step estimator we ignore the fact that the micro coefficients, : q , are estimated using the full sample and therefore the estimated fixed effects are correlated. Since about 1000 students are available to estimate each quartile effect, this seems likely to be of minor importance.
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9% in the second quartile, 29% in the third quartile, and 49% in the upper quartile.
Adjusting for baseline scores using the two-step procedure described above generates more precise and mostly larger treatment effects than the analysis of group means. For example, the unweighted estimate from a model with pair effects and school covariates, reported in column 3 of Table 7 , is .12 (s.e.=.051). The weighted estimate falls to .068 (s.e.=.041), but this now contrasts with an estimate for 2000 of only .039 (s.e.=.047). Moreover, the weighted estimates from this specification in the balanced and low-rate samples show significant treatment effects for 2001 on the order of .07-.08, with no corresponding effect in 2000.
The weighted estimates in the balanced sample also point to a treatment effect when estimated in models with no controls and school covariates only.
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The last two columns in Table 7 report estimates of treatment effects in micro data. The standard errors reported in parentheses use a conventional GEE cluster-adjustment, while BRL standard errors are shown in brackets. The estimates in column 8 are all significant, even when precision is measured using the larger BRL standard errors. Estimates in column 7 for the balanced sample are also significant, and again on the order of 8%. Moreover, none of the micro-data estimates show evidence of a (spurious) treatment effect in 2000. Interestingly, the BRL standard errors are often close to the unadjusted two-step standard errors, typically slightly lower, though occasionally slightly higher.
On balance, the results in Tables 6 and 7 support the notion that the Achievement Awards program increased Bagrut rates in 2001 by something on the order of 6-8 percentage points (using the smaller weighted or micro-data estimates). As an additional check on the causal interpretation of these results, we estimated models allowing treatment effects to vary with lagged score quartiles. That is, we estimated
22 where * q is a quartile-specific treatment effect and : q is a quartile main effect. Students with very low scores were unlikely to be able to obtain a Bagrut no matter how hard they tried in the treatment year. On the other hand, some relatively high-scoring students had scores in a range where extra effort may have made a difference. We therefore look for significant estimates of * 3 and * 4 in 2001, but not in 2000.
`As noted earlier, about half of students in the upper quartile ended up obtaining a Bagrut while almost no one in the lower quartile did. This can be seen in the pattern of control group means by quartile, which are reported along with quartile-specific treatment effects in Table 8 . The model used for all of the estimates in this table included school covariates and pair effects, corresponding to the estimates in column 8 of Table 7 . Small and insignificant treatment effects were estimated in the first two quartiles, with much The data used for Tables 6 and 7 and the first 4 columns of Table 8 come from the June 2001 round of Bagrut tests, i.e., before the Winter retests. We focused on the initial round of test results in the schools experiment because, as discussed above, the program was disrupted in early summer by adverse publicity.
This seems likely to have reduced the scope for a treatment effect in the retests. A second consideration is that there was a unexpected round of second-chance Bagrut tests offered in math and English in late summer/early Fall 2001, between the first round and the traditional Winter round. We are not sure how this might have affected the Achievement Awards program, but some observers noted that the purpose here seemed to be to get Bagrut rates up by easing standards. In any case, the last 4 columns of Table 8 , which report estimated treatment effects by quartile using data that incorporates results from the unexpected second chance and the Winter retests, show results broadly similar to the June results. The largest treatment control differences appear in the third and fourth quartile, while there are no significant effects in 2000. 17 Estimates for the fourth quartile are somewhat smaller and no longer significant in the full sample, but remain significant in the balanced and low-rate samples. Estimates for the third quartile are somewhat larger.
V. Conclusions and Further Work
Although the evidence is not seamless, the school-based randomized trial suggests worthwhile gains in matriculation rates can be obtained by offering cash awards in low Another way to benchmark costs and benefits is by comparison with other Bagrut-enhancement strategies. In the introduction we noted that most service-oriented strategies appear to have been ineffective.
Not long after the Achievement Awards demonstration, however, the Ministry of Education piloted a relatively expensive service-oriented strategy offering intensive after-school instruction to small groups of under-performing students in several matriculation subjects. The results of an evaluation point to an 11 percent increase in Bagrut rates for students in the group offered treatment, at an average cost of $1,100 per student (Israel Ministry of Education, 2002) . The after-school program therefore cost almost 3 times as much, while producing an effect only about 50 percent larger.
In contrast with the school-based bonuses intervention, a smaller pilot program that selected individual students within schools for treatment, with treatment status determined by previous test scores and a randomized cutoff for low socioeconomic status, had no effect. This suggests that school-wide mobilization may be an important part of the incentive structure in programs of this type. On the other hand, delays and a relatively small sample may also account for the lack of a finding in the pilot.
On the methodological side, the paper compares alternative strategies for inference in a GRT. A graphical analysis suggests the program had an effect, albeit heterogeneous and variable across schools.
Statistical analyses of school means generates results with a clear pattern of effects when unweighted, but more mixed results when weighted. A two-step method that uses micro data to reduce the dispersion of group averages generates somewhat sharper weighted results than a straight grouped analysis, while biascorrected standard errors for micro-data estimates also leave an impression of significant effects. Finally, conditioning on lagged test scores generates a pattern of estimates consistent with the notion that the program raised matriculation rates.
The analysis here covers the immediate short-run impact on the Achievement Awards programs' target objective, high school matriculation status. In work in progress, we are looking at additional mediating outcomes, such as whether treated students took more tests or changed subjects, and whether they participated in remedial instruction. In future work, we hope to assess the long-run effects of the Achievement Awards program by collecting information on university attendance and possibly earnings.
Finally, we are conducting a detailed Monte Carlo study of alternate modes of inference with school-based randomized trials. Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for three subsamples from the pilot experiment conducted in Southern Israel. All 146 students with a very low predicted probability of obtaining a Bagrut (p 1i ) were offered awards (all-treated sample). None of the 612 students with a high predicted probability of obtaining a Bagrut were offered awards (no-treated sample). Offers in the middle group, referred to as the eligible sample, were determined by whether an index of students' socioeconomic background (p 2i ) fell below a randomly assigned threshold determined by Z i . Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in columns of means. Standard errors are reported in parentheses in column 2. , where the offer of a bonus equals the randomly assigned threshold. The no-first-stage sample has p 2ii outside this range, where the offer of a bonus is unrelated to the randomly assigned 
